Nuclear Explosive Testing

Explosive testing

Nuclear weapons are in large part designed by trial and error. The trial often involves test explosion of a prototype.

In a nuclear explosion, a large number of discrete events, with various probabilities, aggregate into short-lived, chaotic energy flows inside the device casing. Complex mathematical models are required to approximate the processes, and in the 1950s there were no computers powerful enough to run them properly. Even today's computers and their codes are not fully adequate.

It was easy enough to design reliable weapons for the stockpile. If the prototype worked, it could be weaponized and mass produced.

It was much more difficult to understand how it worked or why it failed. Designers gathered as much data as possible during the explosion, before the device destroyed itself, and used the data to calibrate their models, often by inserting fudge factors into equations to make the simulations match experimental results. They also analyzed the weapon debris in fallout to see how much of a potential nuclear reaction had taken place.

Light pipes

An important tool for test analysis was the diagnostic light pipe. A probe inside a test device could transmit information by heating a plate of metal to incandescence, an event that could be recorded at the far end of a long, very straight pipe.

The picture below shows the Shrimp device, detonated on March 1, 1954 at Bikini, as the Castle Bravo test. Its 15-megaton explosion was the largest ever by the United States. The silhouette of a man is shown for scale. The device is supported from below, at the ends. The pipes going into the shot cab ceiling, which appear to be supports, are diagnostic light pipes. The eight pipes at the right end (1) sent information about the detonation of the primary. Two in the middle (2) marked the time when x-radiation from the primary reached the radiation channel around the secondary. The last two pipes (3) noted the time radiation reached the far end of the radiation channel, the difference between (2) and (3) being the radiation transit time for the channel.

From the shot cab, the pipes turned horizontal and traveled 7500 ft (2.3 km), along a causeway built on the Bikini reef, to a remote-controlled data collection bunker on Namu Island.

While x-rays would normally travel at the speed of light through a low density material like the plastic foam channel filler between (2) and (3), the intensity of radiation from the exploding primary created a relatively opaque radiation front in the channel filler which acted like a slow-moving logjam to retard the passage of radiant energy. Behind this moving front was a fully-ionized, low-z (low atomic number) plasma heated to 20,000 °C, soaking up energy like a black box, and eventually driving the implosion of the secondary.

The radiation transit time, on the order of half a microsecond, is the time it takes the entire radiation channel to reach thermal equilibrium as the radiation front moves down its length. The implosion of the secondary is based on the temperature difference between the hot channel and the cool interior of the secondary. Its timing is important because the interior of the secondary is subject to neutron preheat.

While the radiation channel is heating and starting the implosion, neutrons from the primary catch up with the x-rays, penetrate into the secondary and start breeding tritium with the third reaction noted in the first section above. This Li-6 + n reaction is exothermic, producing 5 MeV per event. The spark plug is not yet compressed and thus is not critical, so there won't be significant fission or fusion. But if enough neutrons arrive before implosion of the secondary is complete, the crucial temperature difference will be degraded. This is the reported cause of failure for Livermore's first thermonuclear design, the Morgenstern device, tested as Castle Koon, April 7, 1954.

These timing issues are measured by light-pipe data. The mathematical simulations which they calibrate are called radiation flow hydrodynamics codes, or channel codes. They are used to predict the effect of future design modifications.

It is not clear from the public record how successful the Shrimp light pipes were. The data bunker was far enough back to remain outside the mile-wide crater, but the 15-megaton blast, two and a half times greater than expected, breached the bunker by blowing its 20-ton door off the hinges and across the inside of the bunker. (The nearest people were twenty miles (32 km) farther away, in a bunker that survived intact.)

Fallout analysis

The most interesting data from Castle Bravo came from radio-chemical analysis of weapon debris in fallout. Because of a shortage of enriched lithium-6, 60% of the lithium in the Shrimp secondary was ordinary lithium-7, which doesn't breed tritium as easily as lithium-6 does. But it does breed lithium-6 as the product of an (n, 2n) reaction (one neutron in, two neutrons out), a known fact, but with unknown probability. The probability turned out to be high.

Fallout analysis revealed to designers that, with the (n, 2n) reaction, the Shrimp secondary effectively had two and half times as much lithium-6 as expected. The tritium, the fusion yield, the neutrons, and the fission yield were all increased accordingly.

As noted above, Bravo's fallout analysis also told the outside world, for the first time, that thermonuclear bombs are more fission devices than fusion devices. A Japanese fishing boat, the Lucky Dragon, sailed home with enough fallout on its decks to allow scientists in Japan and elsewhere to determine, and announce, that most of the fallout had come from the fission of U-238 by fusion-produced 14 MeV neutrons.

Underground testing

Subsidence Craters at Yucca Flat, Nevada Test Site.

The global alarm over radioactive fallout, which began with the Castle Bravo event, eventually drove nuclear testing underground. The last U.S. above-ground test took place at Johnston Island on November 4, 1962. During the next three decades, until September 23, 1992, the U.S. conducted an average of 2.4 underground nuclear explosions per month, all but a few at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) northwest of Las Vegas.

The Yucca Flat section of the NTS is covered with subsidence craters resulting from the collapse of terrain over radioactive underground caverns created by nuclear explosions (see photo).

After the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), which limited underground explosions to 150 kilotons or less, warheads like the half-megaton W88 had to be tested at less than full yield. Since the primary must be detonated at full yield in order to generate data about the implosion of the secondary, the reduction in yield had to come from the secondary. Replacing much of the lithium-6 deuteride fusion fuel with lithium-7 hydride limited the deuterium available for fusion, and thus the overall yield, without changing the dynamics of the implosion. The functioning of the device could be evaluated using light pipes, other sensing devices, and analysis of trapped weapon debris. The full yield of the stockpiled weapon could be calculated by extrapolation.

References:

1. ^ DoE Fact Sheet: Reliable Replacement Warhead Program
2. ^ Sybil Francis, Warhead Politics: Livermore and the Competitive System of Nuclear Warhead Design, UCRL-LR-124754, June 1995, Ph.D. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, available from National Technical Information Service. This 233-page thesis was written by a weapons-lab outsider for public distribution. The author had access to all the classified information at Livermore that was relevant to her research on warhead design; consequently, she was required to use non-descriptive code words for certain innovations.
3. ^ Walter Goad, Declaration for the Wen Ho Lee case, May 17, 2000. Goad began thermonuclear weapon design work at Los Alamos in 1950. In his Declaration, he mentions "basic scientific problems of computability which cannot be solved by more computing power alone. These are typified by the problem of long range predictions of weather and climate, and extend to predictions of nuclear weapons behavior. This accounts for the fact that, after the enormous investment of effort over many years, weapons codes can still not be relied on for significantly new designs."
4. ^ Chuck Hansen, The Swords of Armageddon, Volume IV, pp. 211-212, 284.
5. ^ The public literature mentions three different force mechanism for this implosion: radiation pressure, plasma pressure, and explosive ablation of the outer surface of the secondary pusher. All three forces are present; and the relative contribution of each is one of the things the computer simulations try to explain. See Teller-Ulam design.
6. ^ Dr. John C. Clark, as told to Robert Cahn, "We Were Trapped by Radioactive Fallout," The Saturday Evening Post, July 20, 1957, pp. 17-19, 69-71.[1]
7. ^ Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun; the Making of the Hydrogen Bomb, Simon and Schuster, 1995, p. 541.
8. ^ Chuck Hansen, The Swords of Armageddon, Volume VII, pp. 396-397.
9. ^ ^a b Sybil Francis, Warhead Politics, pp. 141, 160.

Superkonduktivitas

Superkonduktivias adalah sebuah fenomena yang terjadi dalam beberapa material pada suhu rendah, dicirikan dengan ketiadaan hambatan listrik dan "dampin" dari medan magnetik interior (efek Meissner). Superkonduktivitas adalah sebuah fenomena mekanika-kuantum yang berbeda dari konduktivitas sempurna.

Dalam superkonduktor konvensional, superkonduktivitas disebabkan oleh sebuah gaya tarik antara elektron konduksi tertentu yang meningkat dari pertukaran phonon, yang menyebabkan elektron konduksi memperlihatkan fase superfluid terdiri dari pasangan elektron yang berhubungan. Ada juga sebuah kelas material, dikenal sebagai superkonduktor tidak konvensional, yang memperlihatkan superkonduktivitas tetapi yang ciri fisiknya berlawanan dengan teori superkonduktor konvensional. 

Apa yang disebut superkonduktor suhu-tinggi superkonduk pada suhu yang jauh lebih tinggi dari yang dimungkinkan menurut teori konvensional (meskipun masih jauh di bawah suhu ruangan.) Sekarang ini tidak ada teori lengkap tentang superkonduktivitas suhu-tinggi.

Superkonduktivitas terjadi di berbagai macam material, termasuk unsur sederhana seperti timah dan aluminum, beberapa logam alloy, beberapa semikonduktor di-dop-berat, dan beberapa "compound" keramik berisi bidang atom tembaga dan oksigen. Kelas compound yang terkahir, dikenal sebagai kuprat, adalah superkonduktor suhu-tinggi.

Superkonduktivitas tidak terjadi dalam logam mulia seperti emas dan perak, atau di banyak logam ferromagnetik, meskipun ada beberapa material menampilkan baik superkonduktivitas dan ferromagnetisme telah ditemukan tahun-tahun belakangan ini.

SALT: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

"The release of atomic energy has not created a new problem. It has merely made more urgent the necessity of solving an existing one."

~Albert Einstein~

Ballistic Missile

Abstract

Diplomasi adalah seni dan praktik bernegosiasi oleh seseorang (disebut diplomat) yang biasanya mewakili sebuah negara atau organisasi. Kata diplomasi sendiri biasanya langsung terkait dengan diplomasi internasional yang biasanya mengurus berbagai hal seperti budaya, ekonomi, militer, perdagangan dan lain-lain. Biasanya, orang menganggap diplomasi sebagai cara mendapatkan keuntungan dengan kata-kata yang halus. Perjanjian-perjanjian internasional umumnya dirundingkan oleh para diplomat terlebih dahulu sebelum disetujui oleh pembesar-pembesar negara. Istilah diplomacy diperkenalkan ke dalam bahasa Inggris oleh Edward Burke pada tahun 1796 berdasarkan sebuah kata dari bahasa Perancis yaitu diplomatie.

PERLOMBAAN SENJATA: Saat Negara-negara di Asia Saling “Unjuk Gigi”

Saat ini Asia di tengah perlombaan senjata yang belum pernah terjadi sebelumnya, yang tidak hanya mempertajam ketegangan di wilayah itu tapi juga bersaing dengan upaya negara-negara Asia untuk mengatasi kemiskinan dan pertumbuhan kesenjangan ekonomi. Kesenjangan antara kaya dan miskin, jika dihitung dengan pengukur ketimpangan koefisien Gini  menunjukkan telah meningkat ketimpangan dari 39% menjadi 46% di China, India, dan Indonesia.

Meskipun keluarga-keluarga makmur terus mengumpulkan porsi kue ekonomi yang lebih besar dan lebih besar lagi. “Anak-anak yang lahir di keluarga miskin bisa 10 kali lebih mungkin meninggal dalam masa pertumbuhan dari pada mereka yang berasal keluarga kaya," kata Changyong Rhee, kepala ekonom dari Bank Pembangunan Asia.

Kawasan Asia dalam beberapa waktu belakangan ini memang seolah tak pernah sepi dari berbagai bentuk kehebohan, terutama seputar uji coba roket atau peluru kendali balistik berdaya jangkau beragam, bahkan sampai yang mampu menjangkau antarbenua. Layaknya sebuah perlombaan, uji coba diawali Korea Utara, yang meluncurkan roket jarak jauhnya, Unha-3 (Galaksi-3), walau dengan diiringi berbagai macam kecaman banyak negara di dunia.

Roket jarak jauh Korut tadi disebut-sebut punya radius jangkauan lebih dari 6.000 kilometer, atau lebih jauh dari rudal pendahulunya jenis Taepodong-2, yang bahkan diyakini mampu menjangkau wilayah Amerika Serikat.

Negeri Hindustan, India, menyusul dengan uji coba rudal jarak jauhnya, Agni V. India membanggakan rudalnya itu sanggup mengangkut hulu ledak nuklir dan mampu menjangkau sasaran sampai ke Beijing dan Shanghai, China. Seolah menunggu giliran, negeri tetangganya, Pakistan, yang juga dikenal sebagai salah satu negara dengan kemampuan nuklir, tak mau kalah menggelar uji coba serupa.

Berselang beberapa hari setelah India, Pakistan mengujicobakan rudal Hatf IV Shaheen-1A. Peluru kendali itu merupakan versi terbaru sekaligus upgrade dari teknologi rudal sebelumnya, Shaheen-1. Walau radius daya jangkaunya baru mencapai 750 kilometer, kedua varian rudal Pakistan itu diklaim bisa juga dipasangi hulu ledak nuklir.

Memang tidak bisa dimungkiri kemampuan daya tangkal dan efek penggentar itulah yang sekarang coba dicapai dan sekaligus ditunjukkan oleh masing-masing negara tadi, terutama terkait upaya mereka menghadapi potensi ancaman dari setiap negara seteru.

Menurut analis pertahanan India, Rahul Bedi, dengan menyebut rudal Agni V mampu menyasar target di China, hal itu juga menjadi isyarat agar China berhati-hati dan mulai memperhitungkan kekuatan India di kawasan. Terkait kemampuan Agni V, India memang sama sekali tidak menyinggung kalau rudal itu juga bisa menjangkau sasaran di wilayah negara lain seperti Rusia. Dari sana Bedi meyakini India memang ingin coba mulai menantang dominasi kawasan China di Asia.

Sementara itu, terkait peluncuran yang sama oleh Pakistan, yang berlangsung dalam selisih waktu singkat, dipastikan juga menjadi cara Pakistan menunjukkan kemampuannya agar tidak dipandang sebelah mata oleh India.

Intro:

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) refers to two rounds of bilateral talks and corresponding international treaties involving the United States and the Soviet Union the Cold War superpowers on the issue of armament control. There were two rounds of talks and agreements: SALT I and SALT II.

Negotiations commenced in Helsinki, Finland, in November of 1969. SALT I led to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and an interim agreement between the two powers. Although SALT II resulted in an agreement in 1979, the United States chose not to ratify the treaty in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which took place later that year. The US eventually withdrew from SALT II in 1986.

The treaties then led to START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), which consisted of START I (a 1991 agreement between the United States, the Soviet Union) and START II (a 1993 agreement between the United States and Russia). These placed specific caps on each side's number of nuclear weapons.

"I Must Study in Princeton University and then Work at CIA"

~Evelyn SALT, on SALT~

SALT I

SALT I is the common name for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreement, also known as Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. SALT I froze the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers at existing levels, and provided for the addition of new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers only after the same number of older intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and SLBM launchers had been dismantled.

The strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States was changing in character in 1968. The U.S.'s total number of missiles had been static since 1967 at 1,054 ICBMs and 656 SLBMs, but there was an increasing number of missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads being deployed. MIRV's carried multiple nuclear warheads, often with dummies, to confuse ABM systems, making MIRV defense by ABM systems increasingly difficult and expensive.

One cause of the treaty required both countries to limit the number of sites protected by an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system to two each. The Soviet Union had deployed such a system around Moscow in 1966 and the United States announced an ABM program to protect twelve ICBM sites in 1967. A modified two-tier Moscow ABM system is still used. The U.S. built only one ABM site to protect Minuteman base in North Dakota where the "Safeguard Program" was deployed. Due to the system's expense and limited effectiveness, the Pentagon disbanded "Safeguard" in 1975.

Negotiations lasted from November 17, 1969, until May 1972 in a series of meetings beginning in Helsinki, with the U.S. delegation headed by Gerard C. Smith, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Subsequent sessions alternated between Vienna and Helsinki. After a long deadlock, the first results of SALT I came in May 1971, when an agreement was reached over ABM systems. Further discussion brought the negotiations to an end on May 26, 1972, in Moscow when Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signed both the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Interim Agreement Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. A number of agreed statements were also made. This helped improve relations between the U.S. and the USSR.

SALT II

SALT II was a controversial experiment of negotiations between Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev from 1972 to 1979 between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, which sought to curtail the manufacture of strategic nuclear weapons. It was a continuation of the progress made during the SALT I talks, led by representatives from both countries. SALT II was the first nuclear arms treaty which assumed real reductions in strategic forces to 2,250 of all categories of delivery vehicles on both sides.

SALT II helped the U.S. to discourage the Soviets from arming their third generation ICBMs of SS-17, SS-19 and SS-18 types with many more Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). In the late 1970s the USSR's missile design bureaus had developed experimental versions of these missiles equipped with anywhere from 10 to 38 thermonuclear warheads each. Additionally, the Soviets secretly agreed to reduce Tu-22M production to thirty aircraft per year and not to give them an intercontinental range. It was particularly important for the US to limit Soviet efforts in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) rearmament area.

The SALT II Treaty banned new missile programs (a new missile defined as one with any key parameter 5% better than in currently deployed missiles), so both sides were forced to limit their new strategic missile types development. However, the US preserved their most essential programs like Trident and cruise missiles, which President Carter wished to use as his main defensive weapon as they were too slow to have first strike capability. In return, the USSR could exclusively retain 308 of its so-called "heavy ICBM" launchers of the SS-18 type.

An agreement to limit strategic launchers was reached in Vienna on June 18, 1979, and was signed by Leonid Brezhnev and President of the United States Jimmy Carter. In response to the refusal of the United States Senate to ratify the treaty, a young member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware, met with the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko, "educated him about American concerns and interests" and secured several changes that neither the U.S. Secretary of State nor President Jimmy Carter could obtain.

Six months after the signing, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and in September of the same year, the Soviet combat brigade deployed to Cuba was discovered. (Although President Carter claimed this Soviet brigade had only recently been deployed to Cuba, the unit had been stationed on the island since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.) In light of these developments, the treaty was never formally ratified by the United States Senate. Its terms were, nonetheless, honored by both sides until 1986 when the Reagan Administration withdrew from SALT II after accusing the Soviets of violating the pact.

Subsequent discussions took place under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev signing SALT II treaty, June 18, 1979, in Vienna.

Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty

Munculnya Perang Dunia II, mendorong pemimpin berbagai negara untuk mendirikan sebuah organisasi internasional, yakni Perserikatan Bangsa Bangsa. Fungsi organisasi itu, antara lain, adalah mencegah terjadinya tindak kekerasan antar negara serta menyelesaikan konflik di antara mereka secara damai. 

Oleh karena itu, tidaklah mengherankan andaikata pada tahun 1957, organisasi internasional tersebut mendorong berdirinya the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) dengan tujuan mengawasi penyebarluasan tehnology nuklir, termasuk di dalamnya, berbagai senjata nuklir. 

Dalam dekade berikutnya, tepatnya pada tahun 1968, ditandanganilah Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. Tujuan utama traktat tersebut yakni mencegah agar senjata nuklir beserta teknologinya tidak menyebar ke Negara –negara lain selain lima Negara, yaitu Amerika Serikat, Uni Soviet, Inggris, Prancis, Cina, yang telah memiliki jenis senjata itu.

(“What are the recent Developments concerning Arms Control?”, dalam: http://www.newsbatch.com/armscontrol.htm). 

Setelah ditandatangani Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, maka dalam tahun –tahun berikutnya Amerika Serikat dan Uni Soviet, sebagai Negara-negara pemilik senjata paling mutakhir, menyelenggarakan pembicaraan yang bertujuan membatasi senjata-senjata strategis mereka. Pembicaraan yang dikenal dengan Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) menghasilkan perjanjian pengawasan senjata. Bahkan SALT I menghasilkan the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty serta Interim Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement dalam tahun 1972. 

Sedangkan SALT II diselenggarakan dalam tahun 1972. Setelah berunding selama sekitar tujuh tahun, para perunding kedua Negara berhasil membuat kesepakatan menyangkut pembatasan senjata strategis yang baru pada tahun 1979. Akan tetapi, kesepakatan ini gagal memperoleh ratifikasi dari pihak Kongres AS, mengingat pasukan Uni Soviet melakukan invasi ke Afghanistan tahun 1979. 

Setelah mengalami kebuntuan, beberapa tahun kemudian AS dan Uni Soviet kembali melakukan perundingan. Hal ini dilakukan mengingat arti penting pengawasan dan pembatasan senjata bagi kedua negara. Hasilnya, mereka menyepakati traktat yang berhubungan dengan senjata nuklir berjarak menengah, atau yang biasa disebut dengan The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. 

Traktat yang disepakati tahun 1987 tertsebut akhirnya diratifikasi tahun 1989. Dalam traktat tadi, kedua Negara sepakat untuk menghancurkan semua missil yang memiliki jarak jangkauan antara 500 Km - 5500 Km. Sedangkan dalam tahun 1993, kedua Negara menyepakati Chemical Weapons Convention. Dalam konvensi ini mereka setuju terhadap pelarangan pembuatan dan penggunaan senjata-senjata kimia. 

Mengenai pengurangan senjata, pemerintah AS dan Uni Soviet menyelenggarakan pembicaraan dengan hasil dicapainya traktat pengurangan senjata strategis yang disebut dengan the Strategic Arms Reduction Traties atau START I dan START II. Lebih lanjut kedua Negara menyepakati pengurangan senjata offensive trategis atau yang dikenal dengan the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions. 

Sedangkan di dekade terakhir abad XX, yaitu tahun 1996, Perserikatan Bangsa Bangsa mendorong diselenggarakannya perundingan yang berisi pelarangan uji coba secara komprehensif yang biasa disebut dengan the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 

Dalam traktat ini disepakati pelarangan semua uji coba nuklir di semua sektor, baik untuk tujuan-tujuan militer maupun sipil. Traktat ini tidak bisa dilaksanakan secara efektif apabila kelima negara nuklir, yaitu AS, Uni Soviet, Cina, Inggris dan Perancis beserta India, Pakistan dan Israel tidak meratifikasinya. 

Sampai sekarang, nampaknya AS belum meratifikasinya.

(“What are the recent Developments concerning Arms Control?) 

dalam: http://www.newsbatch.com/armscontrol.htm).

Tahun 2002, kedua Negara menyetujui sebuah traktat yang berisi pengurangan senjata offensive strategis.

Mereka sepaham traktat ini mulai berlaku tahun 2003.

  

Indonesia, Million Friends Zero Enemy

Sikap dan Posisi Indonesia

Penulis meyakini bahwa Pemerintah sebaiknya menyadari bahwa banyak alutsita TNI yang perlu diganti dan di modernisasi. Seiring dengan pertumbuhan ekonomi dan kemampuan negara yang semakin meningkat, anggaran di bidang pertahanan ditingkatkan, dengan prioritas mengganti alutsista dengan yang baru, dan sekaligus yang lebih modern.

Indonesia mestinya memiliki sistem pertahanan udara yang canggih dan dapat melindungi seluruh wilayahnya dari ancaman serangan rudal atau missil yang berpotensi menerjang negeri ini.

Membangun alutsista itu sangat penting. Negara yang kuat dan berdaulat itu harus mempunyai alutsista yang kuat dan SDM-nya yang unggul. Sun Tzu itu mengatakan Negara yang berdaulat itu apabila memiliki alutsista yang kuat. Indonesia harus mempunyai penangkalan serangan militer yang kuat.

Namun, modernisasi dan penambahan alutsista pertahanan ini tetap di lakukan sebagai bagian dari pembangunan postur TNI, menuju tercapainya minimun essential force. Indonesia, sama sekali tidak ada niat kita untuk menggelorakan perlombaan persenjataan (arm race) atau mengembangkan senjata pemusnah massal di kawasan.

Tidak pula ada niat untuk menjadi sebuah bangsa yang agresif secara militer.

Indonesia melakukan modernisasi alutsista semata-mata untuk menjaga dan mempertahankan kedaulatan negara serta integritas wilayah. Pemerintah harus segera menyiapkan anggaran melalui sistem tahun jamak (multi years), sesuai permintaan dan kebutuhan masing-masing angkatan, dengan perencanaan, pentahapan dan jadwal waktu yang jelas.

Kementerian Pertahanan dan TNI sebaiknya melakukan koordinasi dan kerja sama yang erat dengan DPR RI, untuk menjamin bahwa rencana strategis ini dapat terealisasi dengan baik dan tepat pada waktunya. Juga kepada pihak ilmuwan di Universitas dan perusahaan dalam negeri, kerjasama ini harus ditingkatkan secara lebih erat.

Baiknya setiap alutsista yang dibeli, bermanfaat bagi pengembangan postur pertahanan negara kita saat ini dan 25 tahun ke depan. Pada saat yang sama, pemerintah harus juga terus melakukan pengadaan alutsista dari dalam negeri. Pengembangan industri pertahanan dalam negeri juga terus dilakukan, untuk memperkuat kemandirian alutsista.

Di samping itu, untuk kepentingan tertentu, Indonesia juga membangun kerjasama dengan industri pertahanan negara-negara sahabat, dengan skema yang saling menguntungkan. 

Namun demikian diplomasi harus lebih diutamakan daripada mempertontonkan sejata dalam menciptakan perdamaian.

“Diplomacy will determine the country’s development”

~Dr. Mohammad Marty Muliana Natalegawa, M.Phil, B.Sc., Menteri Luar Negeri Indonesia~

Sources:
1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_Arms_Limitation_Talks
2. http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/salt
3. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ballistic_missile
4. http://www.mda.mil/ (Missile Defense Agency)

Missile Defense System 

Ucapan Terima Kasih:

Wabil Khusus kepada: Prof. Juwono Sudarsono, M.A., Ph.D.

Juwono Sudarsono - Integrity in the Strict Sense

Mantan Menteri Pertahanan dan Mantan Menteri Pendidikan Nasional

(Born at Banjar Ciamis, West Java; 5 March 1942) is The author of well-respected works on political science and international relations. He was educated at the University of Indonesia, Jakarta (B.A., M.S.); The Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, Netherlands; The University of California, Berkeley, USA (M.A.), and The London School of Economics, U.K. (Ph.D.).

dan 

Marsekal TNI (Purn.) Djoko Suyanto (lahir di Madiun, Jawa Timur, 2 Desember 1950; umur 62 tahun) adalah Menteri Koordinator Bidang Politik, Hukum, dan Keamanan Indonesia sejak 22 Oktober 2009.  Ia merupakan Panglima TNI pertama yang berasal dari kesatuan TNI-AU sepanjang sejarah Indonesia.

Djoko Suyanto adalah lulusan Akabri (di Akademi Angkatan Udara) tahun 1973, sama dengan Laksamana Slamet Soebijanto (Kepala Staf Angkatan Laut), Kapolri Jenderal (Pol) Sutanto, Kepala Staf Umum (Kasum) TNI Letjen Endang Suwarya, dan Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Ia adalah penerbang pesawat tempur F-5 Tiger II yang berpangkalan di Pangkalan Udara TNI-AU Iswahyudi, Madiun.

Juga kepada:

1. Bapak Drs. Tri Cahyo Utomo, M.A. at Diponegoro University, atas Tulisannya: PENGAWASAN SENJATA INTERNASIONAL dan PENGURANGAN KEKERASAN

2. Kak Rezy Pradipta, M.Sc., Ph.D. (Alumni Tim Olimpiade Fisika Indonesia, Nuclear Engineering at MIT)

3. Dr. Yukiya Amano (天野 之弥 ) is the current Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) & Dr. Mohamed Mustafa ElBaradei, J.S.D. (Former Director General of IAEA)

4. Prof. Mujid S. Kazimi, Ph.D. (Director, Center for Advanced Nuclear Energy Systems MIT)

5. Kak Iqbal Robiyana, S.Pd., Teh Nina Widiawati, S.Pd. dan Teh Fitria Miftasani, S.Pd. Alumni Pendidikan Fisika FPMIPA Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia, Mahasiswa Pascasarjana Fisika Konsentrasi Fisika Nuklir ITB dan Founder Center for Nuclear Education at Indonesia University of Education

6. Dr. Petros Aslanyan, M.Sc. (Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, Rusia & Yerevan State University)

7. Prof. Djarot Sulistio Wisnubroto, M.Sc., Ph.D. President Badan Tenaga Nuklir Nasional (BATAN)